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This dissertation examines how analysts react to M&A announcements. Using Propensity Score 
Matching to increase the accuracy of the analysis, I build a sample of comparable observations 
to measure the impact of M&A when an analyst recommendation revision takes place. I find a 
negative influence of M&A deals on revision. Focusing on the specifics of each deal, I also 
analyze the impact of the type of financing being used to the acquisition as well as the under or 
over valuation of the acquirer’s stock. My results suggest that stock financed deals are generally 
perceived in a more pessimistic way. However, when the acquirer is overvalued, analysts react 
positively. I also find that the advisor selection on the target side plays an important role, as 
analysts tend to react more negatively when the sell-side is supported by tier-1 advisors. Lastly, 
in this study I also analyze the impact of knowledge-acquisition M&A in analysts’ 
recommendations, but no statistically significant results are found, suggesting a deeper analysis 





Esta dissertação analisa a forma como as recomendações dos analistas reagem aos anúncios de 
M&A (fusões e aquisições) na empresa adquirente. Através do uso de Propensity Matching 
Score para aumentar a precisão da análise, construo uma amostra de observações comparáveis 
para estudar o impacto de M&A aquando das revisões das recomendações. Nas observações 
com M&A, encontro uma influência negativa nas revisões das recomendações. Focando nas 
características de cada aquisição, neste estudo também analiso o impacto do tipo de 
financiamento usado e eventual subavaliação/sobreavaliação do capital em bolsa da empresa 
adquirente, onde descubro uma relação negativa entre a revisão da recomendação e utilização 
das ações da empresa como forma de financiamento. No entanto, quando o adquirente está 
sobreavaliado, os analistas tendem a reagir positivamente. Também estudo o impacto da seleção 
do advisor por parte da empresa adquirida, e descubro que a escolha de um advisor melhor 
reputado (tier-1) impacta negativamente a revisão da recomendação no adquirente. Por último, 
também analiso as aquisições motivadas pela aquisição de conhecimento, mas não foram 
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The increase in M&A transactions over the past decades, both in number of trades and size, 
reinforces the need to comprehend these disruptive events. However, despite the high number 
of papers dedicated to this research area, findings are still inconclusive due to the different 
measures used which serve the purposes of each study, but make it almost impossible to draw 
clear conclusions on the impact of M&As (Das and Kapil ,2012). Motivated to add new 
evidence to this important research field, in this study I propose an innovative framework to 
study M&A deals using analysts’ recommendations as a proxy for expected future performance. 
Understanding analysts’ recommendations on M&A can be an important guide for investors 
when making investment decisions, and an important guide for managers when deciding the 
specificities on possible deals. 
Focusing on the impact on shareholder’s wealth as an aggregate measure to study the impact 
on the firm as an all, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005), one of the most relevant studies 
in the field, are able to prove a negative impact of M&A deals on stock prices. This basic 
premise of value destruction linked to M&A is, however, limited. Each deal has its own 
structure, with each aspect within it having its own influence. In this study, I focus on some of 
the most consensual findings among existent literature, i.e. the type of financing, deal advisory 
and deal reasoning. 
But before going through the analysis, it is important to understand why the use of analysts’ 
recommendations might be a good instrument for this analysis. As explained in Thomas (1993) 
and Chung and Jo (1996), analysts have an important role in financial markets, playing almost 
as a supervisor and acting as a marketing team for firms’ decisions and their expected impact 
on firms future performance. Furthermore, the belief that analysts have a competitive advantage 
on accessing information, as shown in Conrad et al. (2006), increases the relevance of their 
opinion. This is also proven by Green (2006), that creates an investment portfolio based on 
analyst’s recommendations and finding profitability in analyst’s predictions. Given the 
simplicity of the recommendation, as a straightforward opinion of expected long-term 
performance (Ramnath, Rock and Shane, 2008), it allows a simpler analysis when compared to 
other methodologies, like the ones using returns, in which some assumptions regarding the time 
period post deal and the methodology to use play a fundamental role in the final results. 
By using IBES analyst’s recommendations consensus data from 1993 to September, 2019, I 
construct a sample based on propensity score matching to find the most relevant peers for firms 
engaging in M&A transactions. This allows me to “zoom in” the deal effect on 
recommendations revisions after the announcement of a deal. As expected, the existence of a 
deal contributes negatively to the recommendation revision, which is consistent with the most 
relevant literature. However, despite this average pessimistic movement, the dispersion in 
analysts’ recommendations increases, which may be explained by the early stage of the deal 
(announcement) or the questions regarding synergies capturing. 
When taking only in consideration observations with a M&A deal, the type of structure turns 
to be very relevant to analysts’ opinion. In line with what is found in current literature (Savor 
and Lu, 2009), analysts tend to punish deals made by overvalued firms or where acquirors are 
financing the deal through stock. However, and as anticipated, when the both conditions are 
met, analysts are more positive about it, confirming the “cheap currency” rationale. The target 
advisor also plays an important role. As Ismail (2009) reveals, despite finding no relation 
between the acquirer and its selected advisor on the long term performance of the acquirer, 
there is in fact a negative influence caused by the usage of a tier-1 advisor by the buy side (or 
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target firm).  In this study I am also able to find what’s found by Ismail (2009), being able to 
prove that the existence of a tier-1 advisor decreases the prospects of performance by analysts. 
To conclude, this study also tests the reasoning of the deal, trying to discriminate the expected 
performance for firms engaging in knowledge-acquisition M&A, following the negative impact 
found in York and Wohar (2006). However, no statistically significant result is found, which 
might be explained by the selected proxy, or even by the fact that firms engaging in such deals 
are assuring future pipeline and sales. On one hand, they’re assuring their survival and future 
performance, but one the other hand it can also mean that their R&D investment is not being 
productive enough. This conundrum can confuse analysts and might explain the lack of 
direction on the results. 
Overall, this study is able to reaffirm the importance of analysts’ recommendations, being 
able to find similar conclusions as the ones being found on the most relevant M&A literature, 
like the studies from Christensen, (2011) or Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005). These 
findings might be especially important for investors, as they can find in analysts a guide to 
anticipate the expected performance of a firm when engaging in an M&A deal. This adds an                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
advantage relative to the use of returns, the most typical measure, as now investors may actually 
follow recommendations on companies engaging in M&A. Regarding literature, I also believe 
that the simplicity of the analysis can help.  
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the most 
relevant literature regarding M&A performance, analysts and recommendations importance and 
finalizes with the hypothesis to test. Section 3 gives an overview of the process used, along with 
some descriptives on the sample used. Next, in section 4 empirical findings are analyzed and 
discussed, followed by section 5, where the conclusion can be found. References are listed in 
section 6, while all supporting tables and figures are present in section 7. 
2.  Literature Review & Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions Performance 
Used as a way to boost performance and increase business, M&A transactions have been 
more and more common on the last two decades. In fact, more than $2 trillion were being spent 
yearly on acquisitions (Christensen et al., 2011). In 2018, with more than 97,709 deals 
worldwide, these figures jumped to c. $5,3 trillion (Zephyr, 2019), showing the importance of 
these transactions in the economy. However, Christensen et al. (2011) point out a rate of failure 
between 70% and 90% when studying the long-term performance of these transactions. 
The performance of M&A has been shown to be a very controversial topic, with different 
studies using different methodologies and reaching contradicting results, as can be seen in 
André, Kooli and L'Her (2004) or at Bild et al. (2002). Das and Kapil (2012) claim in their 
review that the “explanatory variables studied in the empirical works reflect primarily on 
researchers’ approach, construct, measurement techniques and data availability, leading to 
inconsistencies among the findings”. This lack of overlap between studies aggravates the 
comparability between them, leaving little space for proper and comprehensive conclusions. 
Incentives to engage in an M&A transaction vary widely and hence should the measures to 
study them. As proposed by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), there are three main motives to 
this kind of investment: synergy, agency and hubris; with the first being the primary one. 
Mukherjee, Kiymaz and Baker (2004) also suggest tax considerations and tax diversification. 
This variety of motivations exacerbates the lack of consistency in current literature. Though, 
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there are still some studies helping to frame and analyze these events from different 
perspectives. In this study, I will focus on the impact of M&A on shareholders’ value. 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005), a reference study in this research field, were able 
to prove that U.S. based acquiring shareholders lost more than $240 billion from 1998 to 2001, 
equivalent to 12 cents per dollar invested in M&A transactions, in line with what Christensen 
et al. (2011) state. Linking to the influence analysts’ recommendations have on capital markets, 
this overvaluation of deals might also be founded in their opinions. Moreover, studying their 
reactions to this type of events should be a complement to M&A literature, helping to frame 
analysts’ view with current knowledge. Haushalter and Lowry (2010) took the first step into 
this direction, studying investment banks’ investment decisions on M&A, when faced with 
different recommendations from their own analysts. They found a positive relation between the 
bank’s stockholdings of the acquirer and recommendation changes by its analysts after the 
merger announcement. This evidence reinforces the need to study analysts’ recommendation 
changes when reacting to acquisitions in a wider range. The belief that analysts’ have a 
competitive advantage over the market when setting their recommendations (Conrad et al. 
2006) further supports the relevance of this analysis for the current M&A literature. 
Savor and Lu (2009) found support for the “hypothesis that overvalued firms create value 
for long-term shareholders by using their equity as currency”, as long as the acquired firm is 
less overvalued than the one acquiring, also known as the market-timing theory. They compare 
overvalued stock to cheap currency, motivating the increase of value creation on the acquisition, 
due to the intrinsic discount caused by that cheap currency. They also give a famous example 
to illustrate that hypothesis, using the America Online’s (AOL) stock financed acquisition of 
Time Warner in the peak of the dot-com bubble. AOL paid almost 48% premium and saw its 
stock dropping by almost 17.5%. However, that deal was regarded as beneficial to AOL, as its 
stock was amazingly overvalued at the acquisition time. This capacity to acquire “hard assets” 
at discount is found to be beneficial to acquiring shareholders and represents a new addition to 
current literature, on motives to engage in M&A transactions, as it generates a new incentive 
for firms to momentarily “artificially boost their stock price” and for managers to go after deals 
where the “joint fundamental value of the acquirer’s and target’s assets is reduced by combining 
them in a single firm”. If able to do so, shareholders should profit from this M&A strategy. 
Savor and Lu (2009) also recommend future researchers to take in account those eventual 
overvaluations of the acquirer, to prevent any biases when studying M&A performance.  
Sehgal, Banerjee and Deisting (2012) provide another angle to support the evidence that 
stock financed acquisitions create value for shareholders in the long term. They defend that the 
usage of stock as currency will also serve as a “risk sharing” tool, helping to assure the future 
performance of the target company, by motivating a superior commitment, mitigating the 
acquisition risk. This type of rationale is also used by most private equity firms when investing 
their capital. 
As Loughran and Vijh (1997) evidence in their study, stock financing might also be linked 
to poorer performance of the acquirer. In fact, in their study, firms acquiring through equity are 
actually getting worth returns than those whose financing is made through cash. However, their 
study does not control for the possible under or over valuation of the acquirer, not capturing 
this effect in particular. 
An important factor to determine M&A performance for shareholders is, of course, the price 
paid and the implied premium (or discount) over market value, where deal advisors play an 
important role. The advisor selection, as shown by Ismail (2009), can play an important role 
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onto closing price. On the buy-side his results are unclear, as he concludes that while acquirers 
guided by tier-1 advisors lost money, tier-2 gained. However, he also explains that those losses 
are mainly driven by huge losses incurred in a small number of “mega deals”. When controlling 
for those, his results indicate no difference regarding the use of tier-1 or tier-2 advisors. As for 
the sell-side, Ismail (2009) confirms a variance between being advised by tier-1 and tier-2, with 
the first ones being able to push more on the closing price, providing more gains to the seller. 
This result is in line with the superior deal hypothesis, defending that tier-1 advisors should 
outperform tier-2 and that the presence of a tier-1 advisor on one of the sides of an M&A deal 
should result in higher wealth for his client. 
An additional factor to take into account when studying M&A performance, is the split 
between sectors. As referred before, there’s wide number of reasons to engage in M&A. Inside 
the “synergies” ramification, we can find, for instance, commercial, organizational or just 
growth. They depend on the specific firm strategy, and they impact the way firms perform. 
Innovative companies, or Scientific Firms, as defined by Griliches and Mairesse (1981), are 
R&D intensive firms with their pipeline depending on their ability to create new products and 
successfully introduce them to the market. However, since late ‘90s, R&D productivity has 
become less efficient, with firms breaking R&D investment records every year but keeping the 
same creation pace (Munos, 2009), i.e. the average cost per patent, one of the most used proxies 
for innovative performance literature (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003), has increased over the last 
years. This increased inefficiency in R&D amplified the risk inherent to it, forcing managers to 
look for other ways to increase their pipeline, embracing M&A in what is called “Knowledge 
Motivated Acquisitions” (York and Wohar, 2006).  
This type of acquisitions, however, seems to be punished by the market. York and Wohar 
(2006) find evidence of a negative impact on firm performance while Cloodt, Hagedoorn and 
Van Kranenburg (2006) prove that the innovative performance of those firms engaged in 
knowledge motivated acquisitions also decreases. However, despite those indications, 
Scientific firms seem to be more and more focused on pursuing an acquisitions-based strategy, 
to renovate their pipeline and assure future sales (Neville, 2019). The unclear conclusions by 
current literature enhance the need for more research into the topic, in which studying 
specialist’s reaction can add useful insights. 
 
2.2 Analyst’s relevance and Recommendations 
Analysts’ activity, since the beginning of the 1990s’, has been closely followed by 
institutional and private investors looking for a guide in the complex world of capital markets. 
Researchers have also explored analyst role albeit from a different angle. Thomas (1993) argues 
that analysts’ importance should be studied by discussing (1) their marginal influence, (2) their 
predictive power/accuracy, and (3) their incentives and conflicts of interest.  
Chung and Jo (1996) addressed the first question in Thomas’ (1993) proposed framework, 
and were able to find evidence of the influence that security analysts’ monitoring and reporting 
have on firms’ market value and management decisions. They found that the monitoring role 
of analysts is seen like a supervisory function on firms’ decisions and results, marketing them 
to investors, enhancing their knowledge on the firms. As a result, they defend that analysts are 
able to affect firm’s market value by influencing manager’s decisions and by their ability to 
communicate it to the market, i.e., affecting investment decisions. This was a fundamental 
output, evidencing the need for more research on this field that will explore the different 
ramifications of Thomas’ framework. Also, Stickel (1995) was able to find evidence of 
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recommendation revisions on stock prices, arguing that the “short term price reaction is a 
function of the strength of the recommendation” and the magnitude of the change. 
Shifting the usual way of studying analyst’s recommendations, Green (2006) created an 
investment portfolio based on analyst’s recommendations, to understand at which extension 
they actually provide benefits to investors who have immediate access to it. Their results were 
also in line with Chung and Jo (1996), as they found incremental investment value for investors 
who follow recommendations as an investment “trigger”. 
Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2008), on an important exercise of summarizing and reviewing 
the current knowledge on this research field, defined not only the Analysts' Reporting 
Environment, but also the list of analysts’ reporting outputs: Earnings Forecasts, Price 
Forecasts, Conceptual Description of the Firm’s Prospects and Recommendations. The latters, 
recommendations, are placed in a special basket, as they epitomize the output, i.e. the “true 
meaning”, of the other three. Also Womack’s (1996) recommendations’ interpretation, “I have 
analyzed publicly available information, and the current stock price is (or is not) right”, helps 
sustaining this point of view about recommendations as the ultimate output analysts give to 
market. 
Analysts and their recommendations play a fundamental role, guiding investors in different 
times and events. Their role as specialists is particularly important when disruptor news come, 
as their expertise and privately acquired information is expected to give them a competitive 
advantage when building their opinion. Conrad et al. (2006) are able to prove that indeed both 
institutional and individual investors believe in this competitive advantage of analysts 
compared to other players in the market. 
Given that M&A transactions are major events in the stock markets, it is surprising to find 
that, to my knowledge, no further literature on the analysts’ recommendations relation with 
M&A events. Furthermore, given the unclear conclusions on the M&A transactions research 
field relative to their performance, examining patterns on how analysts think and behave when 
faced with these events, can provide new evidence to existent literature and might help to 
explain the existing conundrum. 
Conrad et al. (2006) examined “how analysts respond to major news, using large price 
changes as a proxy for the shocks”, following Ryan and Taffler’s (2004) methodology. This 
study represented a first step into studying how analysts can help investors with firm specific 
news and other micro events, in which M&A is included. However, for the purposes of this 
study, their results cannot be completely extended for this study, as they do not differentiate 
several factors that might influence their outputs, such as macroeconomic news, political and 
world events and, especially, news related with future cash flows and discounts rates (Cutler, 
Poterba and Summers, 1989), putting them all in the same basket. In this study, as I focus on 
M&A events, I don’t want to include those effects. 
Current literature has already extensively studied the potential conflicts of interest and 
external factors, intrinsic to the analysts’ activity, that can affect the output of their work. 
O'Brien, McNichols and Hsiou-Wei (2005) explored their potential impartiality caused by 
Investment Banking relationships, finding a certain level of discrepancy in downgrading 
timings when there is a relationship between the brokerage house/investment bank and the 
analyzed company. Conrad et al. (2006) also prove this behavior, exposing a higher probability 
in a recommendation upgrade when there is a relationship in place. However, those resistances 
analysts have, tend to happen in minor changes in the firm’s environment, and not in bigger 
occurrences (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2009). M&A events are always bigger events, disrupting the 
10 
 
firm’s environment and activity, and so, those referred findings cannot be extrapolated to the 
scope of this study. 
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Building on what has already been established in the literature and aiming at finding new 
evidence to support management and investors’ decisions, this study will merge analysts and 
M&A literature and bring a comprehensive analysis on the role of analysts’ recommendations 
in M&A. To study what happens to analysts’ recommendations after deal announcements, this 
dissertation will test the following hypotheses:  
 
H1a: Recommendation revisions after the announcement of an M&A transaction 
should result, on average, to the acquirer’s downgrade. 
 
H1b: Dispersion of recommendations about the acquirer, on average, decreases after 
the announcement of an M&A. 
 
Despite the existent conundrum facing M&A performance, current literature tends to find 
value destruction on M&A deals, as evidenced by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005). 
This underperformance, leading to shareholder’s wealth losses, should be taken in account by 
analysts when setting their recommendations. Therefore, a pessimism towards M&A is 
expected to be found on analysts’ recommendations changes. Furthermore, the confusion 
among analysts is going to be studied, using revisions’ standard deviation as proxy. 
 
H2: Recommendation revisions on overvalued acquirers should, on average, be more 
positive than fair compared to undervalued companies for stock financed M&As. 
 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) found that, one average, firms engaging in stock financed deals 
perform worse than those who do not, i.e. using cash, a mix between cash and equity, or any 
other type. However, as shown by Savor and Lu (2009), overvalued companies engaging in 
stock financed transactions perform better, as their value creation spectrum is amplified by their 
“cheap currency”. Furthermore, the risk sharing perspective explained by Sehgal, Banerjee and 
Deisting (2012), should increase the propinquity to be more positive. Extending the Market 
Timing Theory, “Sell” (Buy) and “Strong Sell” (Strong Buy) recommendations are going to be 
used as a proxy for overvaluation (undervaluation). We expect to find more optimism on 
analysts’ recommendations when facing such deals. 
 
H3: Recommendation revisions on companies acquiring firms advised by tier-1 
advisors should, on average, be more negative than when advised by tier-2. 
 
Following Ismail (2009) findings, there’s the expectation that analysts have target advisors 
in consideration when setting their opinions. Differentiating tier-1 and tier-2 advisors, analysts 





H4: Recommendation revisions should be, one average, more pessimistic towards 
knowledge motivated acquisitions. 
 
Subsequent to recent findings on innovative performance of scientific firms, along with their 
negative market performance after engaging in knowledge motivated acquisitions (York and 
Wohar, 2006), this study expects analysts to be more negative on M&A engaged by those types 
of firms, using a cross sectional approach. 
3. Sample Construction, Data and Univariate Analysis 
3.1 Data & Sample Construction 
To successfully investigate analyst’s recommendations behavior facing M&A events 
throughout the years, different types of data are needed. I based this study on data from the 
following databases: 
• IBES U.S. Consensus Recommendations – to get all consensus data regarding 
recommendations for U.S. based firms 
• IBES U.S. Detail History – to access analysts EPS estimates 
• Thomson Reuters Eikon Dealscreener – to reach data concerning M&A deals 
• CRSP – to get securities data 
• Compustat – to access firm specific accounting data 
The sample construction began with IBES U.S. Consensus Recommendations database, 
accessing all data available at the time, which spans from January 1993 to September 2019, and 
includes 457,707 monthly observations for 10,294 different firms. Each observation in the 
database encompasses the consensus data for a specific firm in a specific month, as consensus 
data points are only calculated from month to month (typically between the 17th and the 19th of 
each month). Consensus, or Summary Statistics, consists of a summary of each analyst data, 
and acts as a proxy for analysts’ general sentiment on each firm (IBES, 2016). 
Recommendations in the database are coded as numeric data, from 1 to 5, respectively going 
from Strong Buy to Strong Sell (1=Strong Buy, 2=Buy, 3=Hold, 4=Sell, 5=Strong Sell). 
Next, M&A data was collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon Dealscreener database for the 
same time period, from 1993 to September to 2019. Only completed deals above $100 million, 
for U.S. based companies, resulting in majority holdings, were considered. In total, this refined 
search includes over 29,049 M&A deals.  
To complete the data collection, CRSP, Compustat and IBES U.S. Detail History databases 
were used to collect firm specific information and to match each observation from IBES 
Recommendations. 
All variables used are listed and explained in Table XIV and Table XV. 
After having all data collected, all datasets were merged based on Official Ticker and Year, 
hereinafter mentioned as Firm-Year, controlling for possible changes in tickers along time. The 
difficulty in merging the four databases, each one with different identifiers and observations, 
has resulted in the loss of observations on both M&A and IBES recommendations data, as can 
be seen in Table I. 
Data was further cleaned for missing variables: information on recommendations, EPS 
estimates, accounting data, and stock market values. This led to another downsizing of the 
sample. To prevent any possible bias from considering outliers, observations below the 
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percentile 1 and above percentile 99, on accounting variables and EPS estimates, were 
excluded, along with firms presenting a negative market value. 
As can be noticed in Table I, the number of Firm-years encompassing M&A deals only 
represents c 2% of the all sample. This type of under representation can undermine results 
(Tucker, 2011) when studying the impact of M&As on analyst’s recommendations. To mitigate 
this selection bias problem, I followed the Propensity Score Matching methodology as 
explained in (Glen, 2017), selecting “Mahalanobis distance” as the optimal algorithm for 
matching. The propensity score was calculated under the following regression: 
 
(1)  𝑫𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕+𝟏,𝒊 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑻𝑬𝑺𝑻𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑩𝑴𝑲𝒕𝒊 +
𝜷𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖𝑵𝑼𝑴𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟗𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜺𝒕𝒊 
 
where Test is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm-year has a deal, and zero if not. Firm-
years from firms that already registered at least one deal were excluded to prevent matching 
within the same firm. Firms where Test equals 0, are included in the control group. 
As can be seen in Figure I, there is in fact a separability in the data. Treated group has a 
higher propensity to engage in M&A, with over 80% of the observations falling between the 
20% and 50% propensity interval. Table II shows the summary statistics for each group 
considered, Test and Control, before and after the matching process.  
As can be noticed, before the matching process, the Control group (firm-years without 
M&A) presents a wider dispersion among scores, with an Excess Kurtosis of c. -2.83, compared 
to the -1.07 of the Test group (firm-years with M&A). We can also notice a disparity in 
skewness values, with the Control group registering a more positive value, of 1.23, confirming 
the longer right tail in the graph present in Figure I. These differences in the distribution led to 
a difference in average and median values, with the Control group presenting respectively 
values of c.22% and c.21%, below the Test Group with 33% and 31%. After the under-sampling 
caused by the matching process, both distributions turned to be very similar. The Control Group 
was reduced to the same amount of observations of the Test Group (best fitting pair for each 
observation in the sample), with just small differences in the average, standard deviation, 
skewness and excess kurtosis. These values confirm the success in the sample reduction to a 
more comparable sample, and led to the construction of the final database. 
 
3.2 Univariate Analysis & Descriptive Statistics 
3.2.1 All Sample 
Table III provides a general overview among the distributions of recommendations before 
and after revision, for each type of recommendation, along with the type of revision (upgrades, 
downgrades or without a change), discriminating between firm-years with and without an M&A 
deal. It is important to refer that, since I’m using the consensus, revisions in recommendations 
for firms with a M&A deal might happen in 1 to 31 days after the deal is announced (consensus 
recommendations are published monthly between the 14th and 19th day of each month). The 
distribution of the number of days to revision, after the deal announcement, can be found on 
Figure V, where a fair distribution among the brackets can be found. However, there is a higher 
concentration on the left side of the graph, meaning most revisions (c. 56%) were done closer 
to the deal announcement (until 15 days after).  
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For both before and after revisions, for all firm-years, there is a higher concentration among 
“Buy” of c. 63% of the sample, with an average recommendation of 2.27 and 2.26 respectively. 
These values are in line with what was found by Conrad et al. (2006) and Stickel (1995), 
evidencing a concentration around 2.1, which is approximately a “Buy”, confirming the 
representativity of the sample. 
Following Stickel (1995), if analyst’s recommendations are indeed upwardly biased in the 
distribution, the average revision should be more limited for positive changes, as there is less 
room for improvement. This result leverages the importance to control for the starting 
recommendation, as it’s done in this analysis.  
The difference in distributions between firm-years with and without M&A deals shows, 
however, a slight disparity. There is a higher concentration on “Buy” for firm-years with a deal, 
weighting around 72%, and “Hold”, with c. 25%. As for firm-years without M&A, we can still 
observe “Buy” as the most represented recommendation, with c. 54%, but with “Hold” gaining 
more relevance and weighting more than 37% of sample. More extreme recommendations, such 
as “Strong Buy” and “Strong Sell” have low representativity, which is also in line with the 
distribution found by Conrad et al. (2006). 
Results in Table III also show that the sample is dominated by no changes in 
recommendations for the all sample (with and without M&A), weighting c. 55%, followed by 
downgrades and upgrades, respectively with c. 25% and 20%. When focusing on firm-years 
with M&A, we already start noticing some difference in the analyst’s response to M&A 
announcements, with Upgrades and Downgrades increasing in their weight. In fact, downgrades 
almost double their weight, to c. 31%, compared to firm-years without deals, c. 18%. 
However, after revision, the distribution of recommendations for firm-years with M&A is 
still in line with was seen before revision, but with a slightly higher concentration among “Buy”. 
Notwithstanding, the average recommendation falls from 2.23 to 2.21, and the standard 
deviation of recommendations also decreases, from 0.78 to 0.77, indicating a smaller disparity 
in analysts’ opinion. Another interesting fact is the drop in “Sell” representation from c. 1.5% 
to c. 0.6% after revision. 
An equally interesting variable to study is the number of analysts following each stock (for 
each observation). As can be noticed in Figure II, there’s a wide dispersion among the number 
of following analysts, with a slight concentration on the left side (smaller number of analysts). 
This fact can be confirmed in Table IV (NUMREC descriptive statistics), where a high Standard 
Deviation of the number of recommendations per observation can be noticed, along with a 
positive Excess Kurtosis of 1.4, confirming the lower concentration observed in the graph. The 
skewness of the distribution can also be confirmed with its positive value of 1.1, explaining the 
right tail of the distribution. To deal with this platykurtic distribution, the number of 
recommendations per observation (or NUMREC) used in the multivariate analysis was 
normalized by using the normal logarithm. 
As for the age of firms in the sample, Figure III shows the distribution in the sample, 
complemented with the values of Table V, discriminating for observations with and without a 
deal. It is interesting to observe that firms with M&A have an average age higher than those 
without (the same can be said for the median). Both samples present similar skewness, but 
observations with M&A present a positive excess kurtosis of 0.5, while those without register 





3.2.2 M&A Sample 
Tables VII - VIII, only contain observations with M&A deals, to understand more about 
the 1,828 deals included in the sample. As referred in the beginning of the section, M&A 
deals with a volume lower than $100m were not considered. 
Figure IV is a histogram with intervals of $100m, from $100 to $1,000, and gives a first 
glance at the distribution of the size of the deals considered. We can already notice the 
predominance of deals on the lower boundary of the graph, with more than 31% of the deals 
being announced with a value between $100m and $200m. From there, we can also observe a 
decrease in the number of observations as the deal size goes up. If the graph continued to plot 
intervals of $100m for deals above $1,000, this tendency would continue to be true.   
Table VI complements Figure IV, with a more insightful analysis, splitting the sample by 
Industry Major Group. We can see that c. 46% of the deals occurred within Manufacturing and 
Retail Trade – respectively weighting c. 20% and c. 26%. When looking at deal values, these 
two industries are still the most represented ones, but with Retail Trade gaining more weight, 
with c. 29%. This happens due to the average deal size, amounting to c. $1,310k in that industry, 
higher than the sample average of $1,161k. Another interesting variable to focus is Deal to 
Market Value of firm (DMK). The sample has a median of c. 9.65%, while Retail Trade has 
10.86%, indicating a higher relative valuation of deals in this industry. On the other hand, 
Construction and Wholesale Trade, with medians of 8.12% and 8.69%, reveal a lower relative 
valuation than the sample. Deals among the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Public 
Administration have low representativity in the sample, thus being biased for the present 
observations. 
Table VII reveals the distributions of deals within different types of financing. The first thing 
to notice is the high reliance on Cash financed deals, with almost 60% of sample, while the 
alternative options share similar weights between 12% and 14%. Another interesting fact is that 
mix financing seems to be the most used option for larger deals, with an average deal of 2.5x 
higher the average deal size, of c. $1,161k, thus increasing its weight in the sample for more 
than 32% when taking into consideration the size of each deal. Regarding deal Size to acquirer 
market value (DMK), Mix Financing also stands out with the highest values.   
In Table VIII we can observe the dispersion of deals among the different types of starting 
recommendation. We can start by noticing the low weight of more extreme recommendations, 
with “Strong Sell” not even having one recommendation. Even “Sell”, with just 1.53% of the 
sample, has a really low representation. On the other hand, “Hold” and “Buy”, together, 
represent more than 96% of the sample. As for DMK, “Strong Buy” and “Sell” present higher 
values than the sample, respectively with medians of 21.65% and 22.99%, almost doubling the 
median found in the sample of 9.65%. 
All these changes in the origination of each deal announcement can impact analyst’s 
recommendations when analyzing firm, revealing the importance of including them in this 
study, guarantying more accuracy in the tested hypothesis in analyzed on the next section. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
As explained in section 3.1, recommendations are grouped into five discrete categories, from 
1 to 5. By using the Consensus database, however, this means that I have in my sample firms 
with a recommendation of 2.14, approximately a buy, or a 3.65, approximately a sell, meaning 
that these observations cannot be perfectly split by 5 categories. With regards to this 
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characteristic of data, the use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis is acceptable. 
Furthermore, Conrad et al. (2006), the most similar study to this one, also followed this type of 
analysis (also including an ordered probit analysis).  
This study will mainly use Recommendation levels after recommendation revisions as 
dependent variable (referred to RECt+1) and M&A related variables as the key independent 
variables. As already explained in section 2 and briefly explored in section 3, since 
recommendation levels can also be affected by other factors, all multivariate analysis are 
controlled for external factors and recommendation starting position (referred to as RECt), as 
explained further. 
In this analysis I’m specifically looking onto the impact of explanatory variables in the 
revision recommendation and, also as in Conrad et al. (2006), pp. 37, I’ll work under the 
assumption of a “standardized unit normal distributed error term, i.e., ɛ ~ N (0,1)”. 
 
4.1 Hypothesis 1 
4.1.1 Hypothesis 1A 
The main empirical question I try to answer in this study is related to the analyst’s response 
to M&A announcements. As previously explained in Section 2.2, recommendations are the 
main proxy of analyst’s sentiment on the firm current position (Womack, 1996) and are the 
ones being analyzed.  
To measure this sensibility to such important market events like M&A transactions, 
recommendation levels before and after revision are measured for all the sample, which 
includes observations with and without M&A after under sampling through propensity scores, 
as explained in section 3.1. 
To account for this, the following regression model is employed: 
 
(2) 𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕+𝟏,𝒊 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑬𝑨𝑳𝒕𝒊  + 𝜷𝟐𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑩𝑴𝑲𝒕𝒊 +
𝜷𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖𝑵𝑼𝑴𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟗𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑫𝑴𝑲𝒕𝒊 + 𝜺𝒕𝒊 
 
where RECt+1 stands for the recommendation consensus level after revision, RECt is the 
recommendation consensus level before revision and DEAL is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the observation includes an M&A deal between RECt+1 and RECt. The remaining variables 
are used as controls and are explained in Table XIV and Table XV. 
Table XI shows the coefficients and standard errors of equation (2). Using average 
recommendation consensus, DEAL denotes a statistically significant negative influence on the 
average revision of approximately -0.23%. The same influence is found where median 
recommendation values are used instead, although a little bit more impactful, with a value close 
to -0.42%, also statistically significant at 1% level. 
These results are in line with current literature defending that on average M&A deals are 
value destroyers for acquirer shareholders. These results are also consistent with the belief that 
analysts have competitive advantages when setting their opinions, as shown in Conrad et al. 
(2006).  
Knowing analysts’ predictions are coherent with future market performance of M&A deals 
opens a new spectrum of analysis regarding M&A and analyst’s recommendations, also 
imputing a new investment value to their recommendations. As shown in section 2.1, M&A 
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events are game changers in financial markets, as they disrupt previous stock price behavior, 
with the introduction of an “external organ” (Berkovitch and Narayana, 1993).  
These results are also in line with what Haushalter and Lowry (2010) document in their 
study, that banks are actually adapting their stockholdings according to their analysts’ opinions 
on M&A. 
 
4.1.2 Hypothesis 1B 
This hypothesis is an extension from the rationale present in the first one. If analysts are 
indeed more negative towards M&A, then the dispersion level of recommendations should 
decrease, as they are converging their opinion onto the same direction. 
As such, the standard deviation of the consensus was used as proxy for the level of dispersion 
and tested before and after the deal announcement, following the model below: 
 
(3) 𝑹𝑬𝑪𝑺𝑫𝒕+𝟏,𝒊 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑬𝑨𝑳𝒕𝒊  + 𝜷𝟐𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑩𝑴𝑲𝒕𝒊 +
𝜷𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖𝑵𝑼𝑴𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟗𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑫𝑴𝑲𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑹𝑬𝑪𝑺𝑫𝒕𝒊 +
𝜺𝒕𝒊 
 
Where RECSDt+1 stands for the recommendation consensus standard deviation after revision, 
RECSDt for the standard deviation before revision and DEAL is the same dummy found in 
equation (2). The remaining control variables are explained in detail in Table XIV and Table 
XV. 
Results of equation (3) can be consulted on Table X, where coefficients and standard errors 
are reported. Using average consensus, results evidence a contrary relationship between the 
existence of deals and the consensus dispersion, as the statistically significant value of 0.8% 
shows. So, instead of converging opinions, analysts are actually diverging their 
recommendations when facing a deal announcement. However, using median consensus, there 
are no significant results and no conclusions can be made. 
The same relationship was tested using Earnings per Share (EPS) standard deviation before 
and after revision, but no statistically significant results were found. 
Despite being the opposite relationship than the one formulated in the hypothesis, the results 
founded in this test are still making sense. 
The first factor to notice is that this study is analyzing the reaction to the deals’ 
announcements, and not closing. This first fact creates a first barrier to information flow, as 
many deal specifics are still to made public, or even to be discussed. 
Each analyst can have a different opinion on value capturing, structure of the deal or even 
regarding the implied premium, as not all firms are publicly listed. As so, even considering that 
most M&A deals lead to value destruction, it is not surprising to find that per se, it is not enough 
to lead to a converging behavior in the opinion of all analysts. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis 2 
Now focusing on observations with an M&A deal only, it is important to try to differentiate 
different behaviors within the analyzed revisions. 
This second hypothesis tests what’s evidenced by Savor and Lu (2009) regarding different 
timings and type of financing on the acquisitions. This analysis was undertaken through the 




(4) 𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕+𝟏,𝒊 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑶𝑽𝑬𝑹𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝑻𝑭𝑰𝑵𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑺𝑻𝑶𝑽𝑬𝑹𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕𝒊 +
𝜷𝟓𝑹𝑬𝑪𝑺𝑫𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖𝑩𝑴𝑲𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟗𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒕𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑵𝑼𝑴𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑫𝑴𝑲𝒕𝒊 + 𝜺𝒕𝒊 
 
where OVER is a dummy variable, used as a proxy for overvalued firms, that equals 1 if the 
firm starting recommendation is approximately a “Sell” or “Strong Sell”, STFIN is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the deal was 100% financed through equity and STOVER is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the deal was done by an overvalued acquirer and stock financed. The 
remaining control variables are explained in detail in Table XIV and Table XV. 
The results of this test are shown in Table XI. The first thing to notice is the statistically 
significance of the three explanatory variables analyzed. Looking at variable OVER, the 
coefficient of -0.335 reveals that being overvalued per se influences negatively revisions of 
recommendations. The same can be said for those deals using stock financing, as can be seen 
by the coefficient of the variable STFIN. However, and as expected, when both conditions are 
met at the same time, the average recommendation revision is positively influenced, as can be 
noticed by the positive value of 0.331. 
These results evidence the positive influence of an overvaluation on the overlook of the 
acquirer, and also confirm the use of analysts’ recommendations as a proxy for an overvalued 
stock.  
As shown in Loughran and Vijh (1997), acquirers financing deals through stock are linked 
to poorer performance. The referred results also confirm this theory, with analysts’ outlook 
being negatively affected by that type of financing. The same can be said about firms considered 
as overvalued, despite the fact of not existing at the moment (as to my knowledge) past literature 
regarding that behavior. 
As to deals where the two conditions are met – being overvalued and financing the deal 
through equity – these results show a positive influence in analysts’ recommendations, which 
goes in line with what is referred by Savor and Lu (2009) and the rationale of using equity as 
cheap currency, or a way to buy hard assets at discount. 
 
4.3 Hypothesis 3 
Following the proposed hypothesis, the third test regards to the target side of the deal, i.e. 
the acquired firm. As evidenced in Ismail (2009), despite the fact of the non-existence of a 
significant influence on the M&A performance caused by the reputation of the acquirer advisor, 
there is in fact a relationship regarding the target advisor. According to him, the existence of a 
top adviser on the sell-side, increases the premium paid by the acquirer, diminishing its returns 
on the acquisition and hurting the firm’s long-term market performance. 
As a way to understand how analysts respond to this event within M&A, the following 
regression was run within the observations with a M&A deal: 
 
(5) 𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕+𝟏,𝒊 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑻𝑰𝑬𝑹𝟏𝒕𝒊  + 𝜷𝟐𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑹𝑬𝑪𝑺𝑫𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑰𝑵𝑫𝒕𝒊 +





where TIER1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target company being acquired is advised 
by TIER1 advisor, as defined in section 3.1. The remaining control variables are explained in 
detail in Table XIV and Table XV. 
Table XII provides the results from equation 5, for the two versions of the dataset (using 
average and median consensus). As can be observed, both versions present significant results 
towards the same direction, with a negative impact of -0.02 on the recommendation revision of 
firms acquiring targets supported by Tier-1 advisors. 
These results confirm the tested hypothesis and are consistent with what Ismail (2009) finds 
in his study, meaning that there is in fact a negative influence in the acquirer recommendation 
revision when he’s announcing a deal for a target advised by a Tier-1 advisory firm.  
 
4.4 Hypothesis 4 
My last hypothesis regards to M&A engaged in knowledge-acquisition purposes. As referred 
in section 2.1, the financial markets seem to punish firms who prefer to buy knowledge rather 
than developing by their own resources, provoking a negative market response on deal 
announcements.  
To explore this fact, it’s interesting to perceive how analysts, as close followers of these 
companies, react to those deals. As so, the following equation is run to understand how this 
type of deals might impact their recommendations: 
 
(6) 𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕+𝟏,𝒊 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝑭𝑰𝑹𝑴𝒕𝒊  + 𝜷𝟐𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑹𝑬𝑪𝑺𝑫𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑩𝑴𝑲𝒕𝒊 +
𝜷𝟔𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖𝑵𝑼𝑴𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟗𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑫𝑴𝑲𝒕𝒊 + 𝜺𝒕𝒊 
 
where SFIRM, referring to Scientific Firms, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer 
belongs to one of the industries defined by Griliches and Mairesse (1981) and the remaining 
are control variables explained in detail in Table XIV and Table XV. 
Table XIII shows the results from equation (6), where no conclusions can be reached 
regarding the influence of knowledge-acquisition M&A deals on recommendation revisions. 
The existence of non significant results may be led by some factors, as I’ll explain next. 
The first one regards the literature time period, as most most literature regarding this topic 
in specific is at least 15 years old. Since then, we underwent trough a crisis and a fast recovery 
period that might have behaved in a different way than the periods previously studied, 
requesting further literature on specific for this topic. 
The second one concerns the deal Rationale and selected proxy. Following Griliches and 
Mairesse (1981), one of the top studies analyzing this topic, the proxy for a knowledge-
acquisition deal was to be categorized as a Scientific Firm. This approach has two problems: 
defines a scientific firm as a firm belonging to a certain industry (explained in the next point), 
which may not be case, and does not control for the reasoning behind the deal, that may follow 
different motivations – knowledge acquisition, business horizontal or vertical growth, fiscal 
diversification or any other acceptable reason to engage in M&A. 
Next, the Industry Selection might also play an important role. As referred, belonging to one 
of the industries referred in Griliches and Mairesse (1981) will act as the proxy “switcher” to 
be categorized as Scientific firm, i.e., to consider the deal as knowledge-acquisition. However, 
this categorization was defined almost 40 years ago, and includes, for example, companies in 
gas and oil industries, which at the time might have made sense, but today does not.  
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Lastly, the is the rationale behind the hypothesis. As referred in section 2.1, the acquisition 
of a firm (or a major part of it) can act as guarantee of future sales and performance, even if the 
implied premium on the deal is considered high. This conundrum between what’s the best 
solution for the firm, as explained in Neville (2019), might be interpreted in different ways by 
different analysts for different cases, impeding further conclusions on this topic.  
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to introduce a new way of studying M&A deals, using the 
comprehensive skills and predictive power disclosed by analysts through recommendations. 
Current M&A literature is inconsistent, confusing and many times wrong, restraining the 
comparability of new evidence and blocking new findings.  
Based on the most established findings in M&A, this study was able to prove the capability 
of analysts when forecasting future firms’ performance, being able to match this study’s 
findings with the referred literature. 
As so, I can conclude that despite the increasing dispersion in recommendations after a 
revision, an M&A deal has in fact a negative impact on newly issued recommendations. This 
finding is line with most of the current literature, defending that overall, M&A activity is 
destroying value for shareholders. 
Digging into M&A activity, some deal specifics were also tested and confirmed, again 
reinforcing analysts’ forecasting skills. I was able to prove that analysts also believe that being 
overvalued per se is a negative indicator of post-deal performance, and the same can be said for 
stock financed deals. However, and as predicted, the “cheap currency” rationale over the usage 
of overvalued stock to finance new deals was confirmed, with analysts reacting positively to 
deals of that kind.  
The impact of the type of advisor chosen by the target firm was also analyzed, confirming 
the hypothesis that being supported by a tier-1 advisor has a negative impact on the acquirer, 
with analysts reacting in a more pessimistic way. 
Lastly, the usage of M&A as knowledge acquisition was also tested, but no conclusions 
could be taken due to the limitations of the proxy used and data availability. 
 These findings open a new spectrum of analysis for both M&A and analyst’s 
recommendations. For M&A, by perceiving the meaning of recommendations on such special 
and disrupt events, investors might find in analyst’s opinion the needed guide when adapting 
their portfolios. As for managers, by understanding how analysts may react to certain facts, they 
can optimize their behavior to protect shareholder’s wealth. 
To understand the relevance of this study, it is also important to refer the shortcomings of 
the analysis. Firstly, as the scope of this study is on American-based companies, the most 
covered market in the world, it cannot be extrapolated to other geographies. Secondly, regarding 
data usage, and as referred in section 2, I incurred in several data loss due to missing values or 
incompatibility between the 4 databases used. Another important factor concerns the time 
period between the deal announcement and the consensus revision date, as it changes from case 
to case (between 1 and 31 days) and might be impacted by other elements that may happen in 
between. 
Following the results of this analysis, future research on the topic would complement this 
study and allow a more comprehensive view over M&A and the way analysts react to it. An 
interesting way to study the topic would be to follow the methodology by Green (2006), and 
create an investment strategy that would invest on firms announcing deals according to the 
20 
 
consensus recommendation. Also, understanding the change in analysts’ forecasts (ex. EPS) 
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7. Tables & Figures 
7.1 Tables 
 
Table I Sample Size Evolution 
Evolution of the number of observations throughout the process of sample construction. Data 
size was significantly affected by the usage of different databases and the difficulty to link the 
observations of each. The usage of propensity score matching also affected the sample by 
reducing the observations without a M&A deal to the best fitting pair. 
 
Steps IBES Rec M&A M&A/IBES 
 [#] [#] [%] 
1. Initial Data 457,707 29,049 6.35% 
2. Merge IBES with Dealscreener 457,707 7,192 1.57% 
3. Merge with Compustat 357,908 6,184 1.73% 
4. Merge with CRSP 203,982 4,033 1.98% 
5. Merge with IBES Detail 203,982 4,033 1.98% 
6. Cleaning Missing Variables 103,972 1,953 1.88% 
7. Winsorizing 90,637 1,828 2.02% 
8. Propensity Score Matching 3,656 1,828 50.00% 
 
Table II Propensity Scores Distribution before and after Matching 
Distribution of each sample before and after the matching caused by the usage of Propensity 
Score Matching. This methodology selected the best fitting pair according to the equation (1), 




Before Matching After Matching 
Test Control ∆ % Test Control ∆ % 
# Observations 1,828 51,795 2733.4% 1,828 1,828 0.0% 
Average 0.33 0.22 -32.4% 0.33 0.33 0.2% 
Standard 
Deviation 0.11 0.08 -26.1% 0.11 0.11 -0.6% 
Min 0.10 0.03 -74.7% 0.10 0.10 -0.1% 
Quartile 1 0.25 0.17 -31.3% 0.25 0.25 0.2% 
Median 0.31 0.21 -33.0% 0.31 0.31 0.3% 
Quartile 3 0.39 0.26 -35.2% 0.39 0.40 0.2% 
Max 0.78 0.60 -22.6% 0.78 0.83 7.3% 
Skewness 0.74 1.23 66.3% 0.74 0.68 -7.7% 





Table III Recommendations Distribution before and after Revision 
Distribution of recommendations before and after revision. for each type of recommendation, 
along with the type of revision (upgrades, downgrades or without a change), discriminated for 
firm-years with and without an M&A deal. For both before and after revision, for all firm-years, 
there is a higher concentration among “Buy” of c. 63% of the sample, with an average 
recommendation of 2.27 and 2.26 respectively. These values are in line with what was found 
by Conrad et al. (2006) and Stickel (1995), evidencing a concentration around 2.1, which is 
approximately a “Buy”, confirming the representativity of the sample. 
 
    All Sample w/ M&A w/o M&A All Sample 











5 Strong Sell - 0.05% 0.03% 
4 Sell 1.53% 2.35% 1.94% 
3 Hold 24.51% 37.31% 30.91% 
2 Buy 71.50% 54.43% 62.96% 
1 Strong Buy 2.46% 5.85% 4.16% 
 Average Recommendation 2.23 2.32 2.27 







 Upgrades 22.21% 18.60% 20.40% 
 Downgrades 31.73% 18.11% 24.92% 










5 Strong Sell 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 
4 Sell 0.60% 2.63% 1.61% 
3 Hold 24.23% 36.93% 30.58% 
2 Buy 72.48% 54.49% 63.48% 
1 Strong Buy 2.63% 5.91% 4.27% 
 Average 2.21 2.32 2.26 






Table IV Number of Recommendations (NUMREC) per observation 
Distribution of recommendations per observation, where a high Standard Deviation of the 
number of recommendations per observation can be noticed, along with a positive Excess 
Kurtosis of 1.4. The skewness of the distribution can also be confirmed with its positive value 
of 1.1, revealing right tail of the distribution. 
 
    All Sample w/ M&A w/o M&A All Sample 







  Average 14.3 9.7 12.0 
 St. Dev 9.2 7.3 8.6 
 Min 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 Q1 7.0 4.0 5.0 
 Median 13.0 8.0 10.0 
 Q3 19.0 13.0 17.0 
 Max 56.0 39.0 56.0 
 Skewness 1.0 1.1 1.1 
 Excess Kurtosis 1.2 0.8 1.4 
 
Table V Firms' Age Distribution 
Firms’ age distribution, discriminated for observations with and without a deal. Firms with 
M&A have an average age higher than those without, and the same can be said for the median. 
Both samples present similar skewness, but observations with M&A present a positive excess 
kurtosis of 0.5, while those without register the opposite, with -0.5, meaning that the distribution 
of observations with a deal presents fatter tails 
 
    All Sample w/ M&A w/o M&A All Sample 




  Average 25.6 21.0 23.3 
 St. Dev 18.9 16.3 17.8 
 Min 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 Q1 9.0 8.0 9.0 
 Median 21.0 17.0 19.0 
 Q3 37.0 27.0 32.0 
 Max 68.0 68.0 68.0 
 Skewness 0.8 1.2 1.0 








Table VI Deals Distribution among Industry Major Groups 
Sample split by Industry Major Group. Almost 46% of the deals occurred within Manufacturing 
and Retail Trade – respectively weighting c. 20% and c. 26%. 
 
     M&A Sample Deals Value DMK 















0 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 4 0.22% 1,989,069 0.09% 30.08% 23.55% 
1 Mining 78 4.27% 76,814,524 3.62% 30.16% 14.62% 
2 Construction 304 16.63% 322,630,202 15.19% 23.10% 8.12% 
3 Manufacturing 369 20.19% 362,723,276 17.08% 23.29% 10.86% 
4 Transport, Comm, Electric, 164 8.97% 259,775,543 12.23% 20.47% 9.40% 
5 Wholesale Trade 105 5.74% 114,675,126 5.40% 18.33% 8.69% 
6 Retail Trade 481 26.31% 620,475,916 29.21% 23.93% 10.02% 
7 Finance, Insurance, RE 250 13.68% 275,381,415 12.97% 23.67% 10.10% 
8 Services 54 2.95% 70,735,062 3.33% 15.63% 6.02% 
9 Public Administration 19 1.04% 18,748,358 0.88% 19.83% 10.19% 
 All 1,828 100.00% 2,123,948,491 100.00% 22.99% 9.65% 
 
Table VII Deals Distribution among types of financing 
Table VII reveals the distributions of deals within different types of financing. Cash financed 
deal represent almost 60% of sample, while the alternative options share similar weights 
between 12% and 14%.  
 
     M&A sample Deals Value DMK 








  Stock Financing 257 14.06% 266,270,551 12.54% 26.09% 9.86% 
 Cash Financing 1,082 59.19% 993,894,301 46.79% 18.08% 7.81% 
 Mix Financing 234 12.80% 680,421,530 32.04% 46.23% 31.67% 
 Other 255 13.95% 183,362,108 8.63% 19.34% 7.01% 
 All 1,828 100.00% 2,123,948,491 100.00% 22.99% 9.65% 
 
Table VIII Deals Distribution for Starting Recommendations 
Table VIII shows the dispersion of deals among the different types of starting recommendation. There 
is a low weight of more extreme recommendations. “Sell”, with just 1.53% of the sample, has a really 
low representation. “Hold” and “Buy”, together, represent more than 96% of the sample.  
 
     M&A Sample Deals Value DMK 











 5 Strong Sell - - - - - - 
4 Sell 28 1.53% 36,134,746 1.70% 33.83% 21.65% 
3 Hold 448 24.51% 377,097,098 17.75% 23.75% 9.78% 
2 Buy 1,307 71.50% 1,697,325,955 79.91% 21.86% 9.03% 
1 Strong Buy 45 2.46% 13,390,692 0.63% 41.34% 22.99% 
 All 1828 100.00% 2,123,948,491 100.00% 22.99% 9.65% 
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Table IX M&A Impact on Recommendations Revision 
Results of equation (2). The number of “*” denotes the significance level, from 90% (*), to 
95% (**) and 99% (***). 
 
(2)  Average Consensus Median Consensus 
   Coefficients   Standard Error   Coefficients   Standard Error  
 Intercept  0.053** (0.026) 0.131*** (0.039) 
 DEAL  -0.023*** (0.007) -0.042* (0.024) 
 REC t  0.948*** (0.005) 0.919*** (0.007) 
 SIZE  0.004** (0.002) 0.002 (0.003) 
 IND  0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) 
 BMK  0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
 ROA  0.011 (0.013) 0.015 (0.020) 
 ROE  0.000 (0.013) -0.005 (0.020) 
 NUMREC  0.006* (0.003) 0.013** (0.005) 
 AGE  0.000 (0.000) 0.003 (0.007) 
 DMK  -0.019 (0.012) -0.020 (0.018) 
 Adj. R2  0.905   0.846   
 N  3,656  3,656  
 
Table X M&A impact on Recommendation Standard Deviation 
Results of equation (3). The number of “*” denotes the significance level, from 90% (*), to 
95% (**) and 99% (***). 
 
(3) Average Consensus Median Consensus 
   Coefficients   Standard Error   Coefficients   Standard Error  
 Intercept  0.082*** (0.020) 0.087*** (0.019) 
 DEAL  0.008* (0.005) 0.009 (0.011) 
 REC t  0.004 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) 
 RECSD t  0.864*** (0.008) 0.863*** (0.008) 
 SIZE  -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 
 IND  0.002 (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 
 BMK  0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
 ROA  -0.003 (0.009) -0.003 (0.009) 
 ROE  0.007 (0.010) 0.007 (0.010) 
 NUMREC  0.03*** (0.003) 0.029*** (0.003) 
 AGE  0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.004) 
 DMK  -0.002 (0.009) -0.001 (0.009) 
 Adj. R2  0.845   0.844   





Table XI Timing and Type of Financing Impact on Recommendations Revision 
 
(4) Average Consensus Median Consensus 
   Coefficients   Standard Error   Coefficients   Standard Error  
 Intercept  0.061 (0.044) 0.306*** (0.074) 
 OVER  -0.335*** (0.065) -0.054*** (0.112) 
 STFIN  -0.037*** (0.010) -0.124*** (0.018) 
 STOVER  0.331*** (0.071) 0.086*** (0.125) 
 REC  0.946*** (0.008) 0.887*** (0.011) 
 RECSD  0.033** (0.015) -0.002 (0.027) 
 SIZE  0.002 (0.003) -0.006 (0.005) 
 IND  -0.003* (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) 
 BMK  0.012 (0.011) 0.009 (0.019) 
 ROA  0.018 (0.072) 0.088 (0.127) 
 ROE  -0.638** (0.289) -0.089 (0.510) 
 NUMREC  0.004 (0.006) 0.018* (0.010) 
 AGE  -0.003 (0.004) 0.005 (0.007) 
 DMK  -0.026** (0.011) -0.033 (0.020) 
 Adj. R2  0.895   0.804   
 N  1,828  1,828  
 
Table XII Sell-side Tier-1 Advisor Influence on Recommendation Revisions 
Results of equation (5). The number of “*” denotes the significance level, from 90% (*), to 
95% (**) and 99% (***). 
 
(5) Average Consensus Median Consensus 
   Coefficients   Standard Error   Coefficients   Standard Error  
 Intercept  0.074 (0.045) 0.308*** (0.077) 
 TIER1  -0.02*** (0.007) -0.02* (0.013) 
 REC  0.934*** (0.008) 0.89*** (0.011) 
 RECSD  0.033** (0.015) -0.007 (0.027) 
 SIZE  0.003 (0.003) -0.007 (0.005) 
 IND  -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.003) 
 BMK  0.008 (0.011) 0.007 (0.020) 
 ROA  0.018 (0.073) 0.088 (0.128) 
 ROE  -0.602** (0.301) -0.180 (0.528) 
 NUMREC  0.006 (0.006) 0.02* (0.010) 
 AGE  -0.003 (0.004) 0.005 (0.008) 
 DMK  -0.022* (0.012) -0.028 (0.020) 
 Adj. R2  0.893   0.803   





Table XIII Analysts' reaction to knowledge-acquisition M&A deals 
Results of equation (6). The number of “*” denotes the significance level, from 90% (*), to 
95% (**) and 99% (***). 
 
(6) Average Consensus Median Consensus 
   Coefficients  
 Standard 
Error   Coefficients  
 Standard 
Error  
 Intercept  0.072* (0.043) 0.072* (0.043) 
 SFIRM  0.001 (0.011) 0.001 (0.011) 
 REC  0.932*** (0.008) 0.932*** (0.008) 
 RECSD  0.037** (0.015) 0.037** (0.015) 
 SIZE  0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
 BMK  0.008 (0.011) 0.008 (0.011) 
 ROA  0.018 (0.073) 0.018 (0.073) 
 ROE  -0.587** (0.292) -0.587** (0.292) 
R&D 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006) 
 NUMREC  0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) 
 AGE  -0.003 (0.011) -0.003 (0.011) 
 DMK  -0.026** (0.043) -0.026** (0.043) 
 Adj. R2  0.893   0.893   






Table XIV Databases - Downloaded Variables Description 
 
Analysts’ Recommendations on M&A 
Downloaded Variables - IBES; Dealscreener; Compustat; CRSP 
          
Variable Acronym Database Type Variable Description 
IBES Ticker 
Symbol 
- IBES NUM  I/B/E/S ticker is a unique 
identifier assigned to each 
security that is consistent 
throughout I/B/E/S History. 
CUSIP/SEDOL - IBES NUM Unique alphanumeric identifiers 
for individual securities. 
Thomson Reuters uses the first 8 
digits for each CUSIP 
IBES Statistical 
Period 
RECDATE IBES DATE Thomson Reuters (IBES) 
statistical (Stat) period is the 
date when the set of summary 
statistics was calculated 
Official Ticker 
Symbol 
- TIC CHAR Official Ticker is a unique 
identifier assigned to each 
security, consistent to one 
assigned in its exchange 
Company Name - IBES CHAR Name for which the company is 




AVREC IBES NUM Summary recommendation 
mean, calculated by assigning to 
each contributing analyst's 
recommendation na integer 
based on a 5 standardized 
Thomson Reuters 
Recommendation Scale: 
1. Strong Buy; 2. Buy; 3. Hold; 
4. Underperform; 5. Sell 
Median 
Recommendation 
MDREC IBES NUM Summary recommendation 
median, calculated by assigning 
to each contributing analyst's 
recommendation an integer 
based on a 5 standardized 
Thomson Reuters 
Recommendation Scale: 
1. Strong Buy; 2. Buy; 3. Hold; 
4. Underperform; 5. Sell 
Standard Deviation STDREC IBES NUM Summary recommendation 
standard deviation  
Nº of 
Recommendations 
NUMREC IBES NUM Number of recommendations 
used to calculate summary 
statistics for each firm 
32 
 
Number Up - IBES NUM Number of recommendation 
upgrades for each firm 
Number Down - IBES NUM Number of recommendation 
downgrades for each firm 
Buy Percent - IBES NUM Percentage of recommendations 
assuming "Buy" or "Strong 
Buy", for each firm 
Sell Percent - IBES NUM Percentage of recommendations 
assuming "Sell" or "Strong Sell", 
for each firm 
Hold Percent - IBES NUM Percentage of recommendations 
assuming "Hold" 
USFIRM - IBES NUM Dummy variable to identify US 
and International companies: 1 if 
from US; 0 if International (non-
US) 
EPS Forecast 1Y EPS IBES NUM Analysts' Earnings per share 
(EPS) forecast for 1 fiscal 
period, as in IBES database 
Number of 
Outstanding Shares 
#SHARES CRSP NUM Number of outstanding shares 
for each firm in the defined 
period 
Price per share PRICE CRSP NUM Stock price for each firm in the 
defined period  
Industry Code SIC Compustat CHAR 4-digit industry code according 
to Standard Industry Code (SIC) 
Book Value BVAL Compustat NUM Book value for each firm in the 
defined period 
Total Assets ASSETS Compustat NUM Total number of assets for each 
firm (current and non-current) in 
the defined period 
Net Income NI Compustat NUM Net Income for each firm in the 
defined period 
R&D Expenses R&D Compustat NUM Research and Development 
expenses, as in the Income 
Statement, for each firm in the 
defined period 
Sales Sales 
Compustat NUM Sales for each firm in the 
defined period 
M&A Deal Value DV Dealscreener NUM 
M&A deal value as announced, 
for each announced deal 
Type of Financing TFIN Dealscreener 
CHAR Type of financing for each deal, 
assuming the possible variables: 
Stock, Cash, Mix, Other 
Target Advisor TADV Dealscreener 
CHAR Name of the main financial 




Table XV Databases – Built-in Variables Description 
 
Analysts’ Recommendations on M&A 
Built-in Variables 
      
Variable Acronym Variable Description 




IND SIC Major Group, using the first two digits of SIC code 
Ln (Assets) SIZE Natural logarithm of Total Assets 
AGE AGE Difference in years between the last observation and the 
first observation found in Compustat database 
Return on Assets ROA Return on Assets, using Net Income as proxy for Return 
(last year reported figures) 
Return on Equity ROE Return on Equity, using Net Income as proxy for Return 
(last year reported figures) 
Market 
Capitalization 
MKTCAP Number of Outstanding Shares x Price per Share 
Book to Market 
Ratio 
BMK Book Value / Market Capitalization 
Deal to Market 
Capitalization 
DMK Deal Value / Market Capitalization of the Acquirer 
Overvalued 
Acquirer 
OVER Dummy Variable that equals 1 if the acquirer 




STFIN Dummy Variable that equals 1 if the acquirer is 
financing the deal through equity 




TIER1 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the advisor is 
considered a Tier-1 following the methodology used by 
Ismail (2009) 
Scientific Firm SFIRM Dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer is 
considered a scientific firm following the methodology 
used by by Griliches and Mairesse (1981) 
Average EPS AVEPS Average EPS for each observation 
Median EPS MDEPS Median EPS for each observation 
Standard Deviation 
EPS 
STDEPS Standard Deviation EPS for each observation 






Figure I Propensity Scores' distribution before matching 
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Figure III Firm’s Age Distribution 
 
 






































Days for Revision after M&A Deal
